The spirit of late socialism and the value of transformation by Luehrmann, Sonja
 
Cahiers du monde russe
Russie - Empire russe - Union soviétique et États
indépendants 
54/3-4 | 2013
L’expérience soviétique à son apogée - Culture et
société des années Brežnev / Volume II
The spirit of late socialism and the value of
transformation
Brezhnevism through the lens of post‑Soviet religious revival
L’esprit du « socialisme développé » et la valeur de la transformation : le









Date of publication: 1 July 2013





Sonja Luehrmann, « The spirit of late socialism and the value of transformation », Cahiers du monde
russe [Online], 54/3-4 | 2013, Online since 01 July 2016, Connection on 01 May 2019. URL : http://
journals.openedition.org/monderusse/7967  ; DOI : 10.4000/monderusse.7967 
2011
Sonja Luehrmann
The SpiriT of LaTe SociaLiSm  
and The VaLue of TranSformaTion
Brezhnevism through the lens  
of post‑Soviet religious revival
“The time of Brezhnev, time of our childhood, was not as closed as they say now. 
We had access to many different kinds of ideas, watched [the ilm] Andrei Rublëv 
and read whatever we wanted.” These were the words of an interviewee, born in 
1959, who relected on the path that led her to be an editor and text designer in 
the publishing department of the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Ioshkar‑Ola and 
Marii El, coterminous with one of the autonomous republics of Russia’s Volga 
region. When i interviewed her in the spring of 2005, she was in her mid‑forties, 
dyed her short hair purple, and greeted me in her ofice in the diocesan center in a 
business‑like attire with skirt and jacket. A graduate of the philological faculty of 
the local teachers’ college with additional training in computer graphics, she had 
shifted to work for the church two years previously after losing her job at a youth 
journal following a change in the journal’s management. She openly admitted 
that her initial motivation for turning to work for the church was economic, but 
described a slow process of habituation to the ritual life of the church whose 
outcome was surprising to herself. 
The editor had appeared for an initial meeting with the local bishop in trousers, 
and was only slowly “imbibing” Orthodox Christianity. Vladyka (the term of 
address for a bishop or other hierarch in the Russian Orthodox Church, from the 
Church Slavonic for “Lord”) had a talent for inding “cast‑aways” (zabroshennye 
liudi) who brought necessary skills, and did not try to rush her own “spiritual 
development.” After two years in church employment, she still found it impossible 
to attend services regularly: “i have a hard time enduring the rigid rituals (zhëstkaia 
obriadnost´).” Asked about differences between working in church publishing as 
opposed to a secular newspaper, she focused on gendered interactions: “here i work 
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mainly with priests (batiushki), and they have more dignity than men in the secular 
media. They don’t curse, don’t drink, don’t smoke.” On the other hand, she often 
found it dificult to maintain the “feminine humility” (zhenskaia krotost´) demanded 
of her in the new setting. But she still concluded that “the Lord brought me to this 
work” and, in spite of her secular upbringing as the daughter of a history teacher, 
created narrative continuity by looking back to her birth: “I was born on Saint Peter 
[and Paul]’s day, and my grandmother always said, what a bright holiday.”1
a path away from training in secular education and culture toward work for a 
religious organization was not rare for a member of the generation whose childhood 
and youth was spent under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev. at the same time as 
economic and political restructuring made public sector employment uncertain and 
often unpaid in the 1990s and early 2000s, religious organizations were expanding 
their scope of activities from liturgical services and life‑cycle rituals to education 
and social outreach. Some teachers, journalists, and cultural workers found that 
putting their skills to the service of religious revival offered better pay, more respect, 
and better or at least more fulilling working conditions.2 during ethnographic and 
archival research conducted in the Republic of Marii El between 2003 and 2008, 
I met many such cultural workers, for whom working for or collaborating with 
religious institutions was a way to make their lives more meaningful and have 
access to more resources.3 
in this article, i take the reminiscences of these provincial converts as a starting 
point for an inquiry into the values and practices of their childhood and youth. 
Whereas some of the emerging historiography on the Brezhnev era treats it as a 
1. All interviews and field observations cited in this article were conducted in Marii El in May‑June 2003 and February 2005 – February 2006. To protect the privacy of my interlocutors while respecting the distaste for pseudonyms expressed by some of them, I identify them by a professional or confessional label rather than by name. 
2. On the precarious positions of members of the post‑Soviet intelligentsia, see Jennifer Patico, 
consumption and Social change in a post‑Soviet middle class (Stanford: Stanford university Press, 2008); Anne White, “Social Change in Provincial Russia: The Intelligentsia in a raion 
centre”, europe‑asia Studies 52, 4 (2000): 677‑694; Agata Ładykowska, “Post‑Soviet Orthodoxy in the Making: Strategies for Continuity Thinking among Russian Middle‑Aged 
School Teachers,” in jarett Zigon, ed., multiple moralities and religions in post‑Soviet russia (New York: Berghahn, 2011), 27‑47. On the work of religious organizations to expand the scope of their activities see Melissa Caldwell, “The Russian Orthodox Church, the Provision 
of Social Welfare, and changing ethics of Benevolence,” in chris hann and hermann Goltz, 
eds, eastern christians in anthropological perspective (Berkeley, Los angeles: university of California Press, 2010), 329‑350; P.B. Chuprikov, ed., Religii Rossii: problemy sotsial´nogo 
sluzheniia [Religions of Russia: Problems of Social Service] (M., Nizhnii Novgorod: Medina, 2011); Jarett Zigon, HIV is God’s Blessing: Rehabilitating Morality in Neoliberal Russia 
(Berkeley, Los angeles: university of california press, 2011).
3. Marii El (known as Mari ASSR before 1991) is an autonomous republic of about 750,000 people, straddling the Volga River approximately 800 km east of Moscow. Religious traditions represented in the republic include the indigenous Mari religion practiced by some members of the titular nationality, Sunni Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and, more recently, a variety of Protestant Christian groups. Sonja Luehrmann, “Recycling Cultural Construction: 
desecularisation in postsoviet mari el,” religion, State and Society 33, 1 (2005): 35‑56; 
Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style: Teaching Atheism and Religion in a Volga Republic 
(Bloomington: indiana university press, 2011). 
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time of quiet religious searching that led to the more public religious revival 
that began during late perestroika, I understand the journal editor’s reference to 
“openness” in a slightly different way. Through the lens of archival sources on the 
cultural institutions and networks of political education that had shaped the views 
and habits of many of my interviewees, the Brezhnev era does not primarily appear 
as a time of religious revival. rather, it was a time when a contradiction internal 
to Soviet ideological discourse – between homage to revolutionary change and 
commitment to stable state structures – led to an impasse. While constantly hearing 
about the value of transformation and newness, Soviet citizens from the late 1960s 
to the mid‑1980s lived in a predictable social world where change was understood 
almost exclusively in terms of economic growth. For post‑Soviet religious converts, 
i argue, this learned commitment to transformation is a more important legacy of 
their Brezhnev‑era youths than any direct experience of illicit religious practice. 
When considering the turn of former Soviet citizens to religion, some scholars 
emphasize the 1990s as a breaking point. They point to the economic and political 
uncertainty of the early 1990s, as well as the changing media representations of 
established religious institutions, as factors that drove people of various age groups 
and occupations to seek meaning and social support in ancestral or new religions.4 
Others look back further and claim that the religious activity of the 1990s was a 
continuation of processes that began during the last decades of the Soviet Union. 
in what follows, i investigate the claim that there was a religious revival under 
Brezhnev to argue that there is limited evidence of such a phenomenon outside 
of intelligentsia circles in urban centers. Rather, the period was characterized 
by a relaxation of ideological vigilance with regard to a variety of non‑Marxist 
narratives about national history and values, which were made attractive by the 
growing atrophy of oficial political discourse. For some people who came of 
age during the period now known as Stagnation, exploration of such alternative 
narratives eventually led to religious practice. The widespread use of the terms 
“spiritual values” and “spiritual growth” in documents from the period provides 
an example of a secular discourse about human potentials that may have inspired 
some people to extend their searches for personal and social transformation into 
engagement with non‑human forces. 
Methodologically, I am inspired by the ethnohistorical and ethnoarcheological 
idea of “upstreaming”: starting in an observable present and using it as a source 
of clues and relevant questions for interpreting historical records.5 Whereas for 
4. Alexander Agadjanian, “The Search for Privacy and the Return of a Grand Narrative: 
religion in a post‑communist Society,” Social compass, 53, (2006): 169‑184; Mathijs Pelkmans, “Introduction: Post‑Soviet Space and the Unexpected Turns of Religious Life,” in M. Pelkmans, ed., conversion after Socialism: disruptions, modernism and Technologies of 
faith in the former Soviet union (New York: Berghahn, 2009) 1‑16. 
5. William Sturtevant, “anthropology, history, and ethnohistory,” ethnohistory, 13, 1‑2 (1966): 1‑51; Michael K. Foster, “On Who Spoke First at Iroquois‑White Councils: An Exer‑
cise in the method of upstreaming,” in michael foster, jack campisi, and marianne mithan, 
eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 183‑207. 
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historians this may sound like dangerous presentism,6 I would argue that debates 
about the beginning of religious revival on the territory of the former Soviet Union 
necessarily involve looking at historical evidence from a perspective that is colored 
by the observation of present social trends. For example, scholars who argue that 
the history of state‑imposed atheism and religious resurgence in the former Soviet 
union demonstrates that people are naturally religious often focus on evidence of 
the continuous strength of religiosity throughout the Soviet period.7 By contrast, 
scholars who wish to emphasize the contingent and (re‑)invented character of many 
post‑Soviet religious phenomena tend to ind a more robust presence of atheism 
especially among the postwar Soviet generations, who grew up in a society in 
which access to religious institutions had been severely curtailed.8 
More generally, empirical research on the inal decades of the Soviet Union was 
pioneered by anthropologists and other social scientists with an explicit interest 
in moving “upstream” from post‑socialist developments and constructing their 
genealogy. A prominent example is Alexei Yurchak’s work on the “last Soviet 
generation,” based on letters and journals contributed by people born between the 
1950s and early 1970s and motivated by the question why people who grew up 
under a supposedly “stagnant” system often adapted quite readily to the changes 
of perestroika and emerging capitalism.9 as archival collections ranging from the 
late 1960s to the early 1980s become accessible to historians, they can correct 
some of the images of those years constructed by social scientists. Historians, for 
instance, might be skeptical of Yurchak’s tendency to lump all of Soviet history 
after 1950 together as the time after “Stalin’s uncanny paradigm shift”10 from a 
society controlled by ideology as interpreted by an authoritative leader to a realm 
of performativity where correct behavior was more important than ideological 
agreement. Archives‑based studies on the 1950s, 60s, and 70s are much more 
careful to unearth differences as well as similarities between these decades, as the 
Soviet union went through several changes in leadership and economic climate, 
and was exposed to different forms of international inluence.11 
6. James Axtell, “Ethnohistory: An Historian’s Viewpoint,” ethnohistory, 26, 1 (1979): 1‑13. 
7. Paul Froese, The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
8. Jeanne Kormina and Sergei Shtyrkov, “St. Xenia as a Patron of Female Social Suffering: 
an essay on anthropological hagiology,” in Zigon, ed., multiple moralities, 168‑190; 
Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style.
9. Alexei Yurchak, everything Was forever, until it Was no more: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). Other examples include Bruce Grant, in the 
Soviet house of culture: a century of perestroikas (princeton: princeton university press, 
1995), and douglas rogers, The old faith and the russian Land: a historical ethnography of 
ethics in the urals (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). Both books contain information on 
Brezhnev‑era consolidations of rural settlements and their post‑Soviet repercussions. 
10. Yurchak, everything was forever, 36.
11. Anne Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, eds., The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the 
Second World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). For a volume that brings 
together historians and anthropologists in their view of life under Brezhnev and his immediate 
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recognizing such dangers of genealogical approaches, archival research on 
the recent past can be usefully motivated by links which “witnesses of the times” 
(German Zeitzeugen) establish between then and now. For example, the journal 
editor’s claim that the openness of her youth somehow explains her current 
religious engagement can give rise to a number of questions for deeper probing 
into written and oral sources. What exactly was Brezhnev‑era society open to? 
What was it about this openness that enabled some members of the last Soviet 
generation to later become engaged in religious work? Since the journal editor was 
not alone among post‑Soviet churchgoers in describing her religious involvement 
as something quite recent and initially dificult, I assume that what they picked up 
in their youth were not religious inclinations, but an array of skills and values with 
no overt theological content that helped involvement in a faith community make 
sense later in life. Rather than being a continuation of a religious turn that started 
under Brezhnev, I see post‑Soviet religiosity among members of the last Soviet 
generation as one possible response to a key contradiction of the Brezhnev era that 
can be traced in archival documents as well as oral testimonies: the contradiction 
between a continuing rhetorical commitment to growth and change and increasingly 
rigid structures of bureaucratic control. 
The question of late Soviet religious revival
The emerging historical scholarship on the Brezhnev era conirms my interlocutor’s 
sense that much more went on during the years between 1964 and 1982 than is 
suggested by the label of “stagnation.” Although Brezhnev replaced the utopian 
promises of Khrushchev’s rule with a more bureaucratic approach to leadership 
that emphasized stability and predictability for bureaucratic elites as well as for 
those governed by them,12 many areas of cultural life remained in lux even after the 
crackdown against the Prague spring in 1968. The work of the ilmmaker Andrei 
Arsen´evich Tarkovskii (1932‑1986), whose ilm about the ifteenth‑century monk 
and icon painter Andrei Rublëv was shot in 1965 and released in a cut version in 
1971 is an example of the possibilities as well as the limits of cultural creativity 
during those years.13 
Tarkovskii’s success in representing Russian Orthodox Christianity as an 
integral part of Russia’s historical identity, and an icon painter as an archetype 
of the modern artist, resonated with a number of other cultural trends of the late 
1960s and 70s that indicated an increased interest in the pre‑Soviet past and in the 
successors, see Neringa Klumbyte and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, eds., Soviet Society in the era of Late Socialism, 1964‑1985 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013). 
12. George Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet 
politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982); Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, how the 
Soviet union is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), chapter 7. 
13. nariman Skakov, The Cinema of Tarkovsky: Labyrinths of Space and Time (London: 
Tauris, 2012).
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construction of national roots. The documentation and preservation of archeological 
sites and architectural monuments became a concern for youth groups and local 
history clubs, the so‑called “village prose” writers mourned the destruction of rural 
communities through urbanization and environmental degradation, and movements 
of hikers and mountaineers discovered some of the same rural spaces anew.14 
In oficial cultural policy, Russians began to receive attention as an ethnic group 
with its own cultural traditions. The Khrushchev‑era campaign for “new traditions” 
led to a more focused attempt starting in 1965 to promote secularized versions of 
popular festivals, which came to include such Russian folk celebrations (cleansed 
of their christian content) as “farewell to the russian winter” (maslennitsa) and 
“birch tree” (berëzka, taking up themes of pentecost), and the press discussed 
russian peasant culture with increasing frequency.15 contrasting with these 
more conservationist trends but equally indicative of ongoing shifts away from 
revolutionary Marxist Orthodoxy were developments toward greater attention to 
mass appeal in ilm production and theater, growing awareness of international 
fashion and consumer culture through ilm and television, and new ields of 
empirical sociology and ethnography that studied the social reality of Soviet 
citizens rather than looking at them through the predictions of evolutionist schemes 
of historical development.16 As probably the economically most prosperous period 
in the history of the Soviet Union, the 1970s offered ample opportunity for people 
to engage their activities and imaginations outside of the frameworks narrowly 
deined by Communist Party and trade union organizations. 
Some scholars argue that these trends toward an interest in areas of life not 
immediately sanctioned by oficial ideology translated into a widespread turn to 
religion as the ultimate haven of national traditions and non‑Marxist ideology. There 
are indeed convincing indications for some increase in religious activity during the 
later years of the Brezhnev era. Drawing on a mix of archival documents and oral 
14. emily johnson, How Saint Petersburg Learned to Study Itself: The Russian Idea of Kraevedenie (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006); Kathleen Parthé, 
russian Village prose: The radiant past (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Jeremy Morris, “From Chudak to Mudak? Village Prose and the Absurdist Ethics of Evgenii Popov,” 
modern Language review, 99, 3 (2004): 696‑710.
15. Anonymous, “Sotsiologicheskoe pereustroistvo byta i bor´ba za novye traditsii [The sociological transformation of life and the struggle for new traditions],” lecture script for discussion in the atheist section of the Knowledge Society, 1963, Copy on file in the Russian State Library, Moscow; Iurii V. Arutiunian et al., russkie: etnosotsiologicheskie ocherki [The Russians: ethnosociological essays] (M.: Nauka, 1992), 392; Margaret Paxson, Solovyovo: 
The Story of memory in a russian Village (Bloomington: indiana university press, 2005), 335‑336.
16. Joshua First, “From Spectator to Differentiated Consumer: Film Audience Research in the Era of Developed Socialism (1965‑80),” Kritika, 9, 2 (2008): 317‑344; Susan Costanzo, 
“reclaiming the Stage: amateur Theater‑Studio audiences in the Late Soviet era,” Slavic 
review, 57, 2 (1998): 398‑424; Ol´ga Gurova, Sovetskoe nizhnee bel´e: mezhdu ideologiei i povsednevnost´iu [Soviet underwear: between ideology and the everyday] (M.: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2008), 125‑134; Vladimir Shlapentokh, The politics of Sociology in 
the Soviet union (Boulder: Westview, 1987); Iulian Bromlei, etnos i etnografiia [ethnos and ethnography] (M.: Nauka, 1973). 
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histories from members of the intelligentsia in the Ukrainian SSR, Viktor Yelensky 
concludes that by the mid‑1970s, control over the activity of religious organizations 
had relaxed and religious institutions as well as informal esoteric circles attracted young 
members.17 Judith Deutsch Kornblatt documents the experience of ethnic Jews who 
became Russian Orthodox Christians in the 1960s and remained active in the 1970s, 
most famously in the circle around the priest Aleksandr Men´. Protestant dissenters 
drew the attention of their western contemporaries from the mid‑1960s onward.18
Drawing on oral histories with members of the administrative and political 
apparatus of the Communist Party in Moscow and other members of the political 
and academic elite, nikolai mitrokhin likewise emphasizes the religious leanings 
which many of his interviewees cultivated during their youth. he suggests that 
spiritual searching in reaction to urbanization and secularization paralleled the 
contemporaneous spread of new religious movements among young people in 
Western europe and north america. in a somewhat softer version of the same 
narrative, john and carol Garrard argue that the increased interest in national 
heritage evident throughout the Brezhnev era prepared the way for the upsurge 
of interest in Russian Orthodox Christianity that occurred during the celebrations of 
the millennium of the baptism of the Kievan Rus´ in 1988.19 Sergei Zhuk, based on 
evidence from eastern Ukraine, points to the way in which school ield trips taken 
in the name of patriotism and interest in cultural heritage exposed young people 
to ideas that were outside the framework of Soviet ideology, including religious 
traditions. Looking at Soviet Central Asia, Adeeb Khalid sees Islam turning into an 
important aspect of national heritage after Stalin’s death, through the secularization 
of ethnic celebrations and traditions, but also through the emergence of unoficial 
circles of students around ulama (religious scholars).20
Focusing on different religious traditions, these scholars describe the 
Brezhnev‑era Soviet union as a world that was diverse in ideology and lifestyle. 
17. Viktor Yelensky, “The Revival before the Revival: Popular and Institutionalized Religion 
in ukraine on the eve of the collapse of communism,” in catherine Wanner, ed., State 
Secularism and Lived religion in Soviet russia and ukraine (New York: Oxford University 
press, 2012), 302‑330. 
18. Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, Doubly Chosen: Jewish Identity, the Soviet Intelligentsia, and the Russian Orthodox Church (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Michael Bourdeaux, religious ferment in the Soviet union: protestant opposition to Soviet religious 
policy (London: Macmillan, 1968). 
19. nikolai mitrokhin, “peredacha, institutionalizatsiia i chastichnaia kommertsializatsiia religioznykh praktik v srede sovetskoi intelligentsii vo vtoroi polovine 1950kh – pervoi polovine 1980kh godov [The transmission, institutionalization, and partial commercialization of religious practices among the Soviet intelligentsia from the late 1950s to the early 1980s],” 
paper delivered at the conference “Lived religion in the uSSr: Survival and resistance under Forced Secularization,” Russian State Humanities University, February 16, 2012; John and 
carol Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia (princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). 
20. Sergei Zhuk, “Religion, Westernization, and Youth in the ‘Closed City’ of Soviet Ukraine, 1964‑84,” russian review, 67, 4 (2008): 661‑679; Adeeb Khalid, islam after communism: 
religion and politics in central asia (Berkeley/L.A.: University of California Press, 2007), 
112‑114.
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They are sensitive to the methodological problem of sharply dividing the 
post‑Soviet era (as a time of religious revival) from the Soviet era (as a time of 
atheism and religious repression), when the biographies of several generations 
of Soviet citizens stretch across both periods. However, their sources are limited 
either to the memories of members of urban, highly educated elites or to materials 
from the ukrainian SSr. The latter may present an untypical case, since the 
western parts of the republic became part of the Soviet Union after the Second 
World War, when the worst physical persecution of religious believers had ceased. 
The Ukrainian population thus had unusually high levels of exposure to lived 
religious practice throughout the postwar era.21 
Another source of claims for a Brezhnev‑era religious revival are reports by 
Soviet oficials that warn of high levels of religious activity. These are not new to 
the 1970s, but recur periodically throughout the 1950s and 60s. In the Volga region, 
increases in donations to churches and mosques were reported at least since the 
early 1960s and continue into the 1970s. Oficials explain the increases by reference 
to the rising levels of prosperity of Soviet citizens.22 Bureaucratic reports on high 
levels of engagement with religious rituals are usually linked to calls to combat 
unregistered religiosity23 or to supervise existing organizations more strictly.24 
It is thus hard to tell if such reports relect actual increases in religiosity, or rather 
the rhythms of Soviet political campaigns, where times of heightened attention to 
religiosity alternated with periods when other issues were higher on the agenda.25 
21. catherine Wanner, Communities of the Converted: Ukrainians and Global Evangelism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). 
22. NART (Natsional´nyi arkhiv respubliki Tatarstan – National Archive of the Republic of Tatarstan), f. R‑873, Commissioner for Religious Affairs, op. 1, d. 11, l. 110‑111, Report on the work of the commissioner of religious cult affairs for the Tatar ASSR, April 1963; GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii – State Archive of the Russian Federation), f. R‑6991, Council of Religious Affairs, op. 6., d. 634, l. 100, Report from the commissioner of religious affairs for the Mari ASSR, October 21, 1974. 
23. GARF, f. R‑6991, op. 3, d. 571, l. 134, Report of Commissioner Nabatov on religious life in the Mari ASSR, October 12, 1950; GARF, f. 6991, op. 4, d. 308, Simultaneous count of religious organizations on January 1, 1962, Materials from the Mari ASSR; NART, f. R‑873, op. 1, d. 13, l. 60‑61, Circular from the Council of Ministers of the Tatar ASSR to District and Town Executive Committees reporting on the results of the simultaneous count in the Tat ASSR, June 19, 1962. 
24. NART, f.  R‑873, op.  1, d.  11, l.  6‑8, Report on carrying out the Council of Ministers resolution of March 16, 1961, “On strengthening the control over enforcement of laws on 
religious cults,” commissioner mangutkin, n.d. 
25. for attempts to periodicize these campaigns in earlier decades of Soviet history, see Tatiana 
chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years (Armonk: Sharpe, 2002, transl. Edward Roslof); Mikhail Shkarovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov´ v XX veke [The Russian Orthodox Church in the twentieth century] (M.: Lepta, 2010). On the problem of a possible overemphasis on religious practices in Soviet reports, see Sonja Luehrmann (Sonia Liurmann), “Chto my mozhem znat´ o sovetskoi religioznosti? Sopostavlenie arkhivnykh i ustnykh istochnikov iz poslevoennogo Povolzh´ia [What can we know about Soviet‑era religiosity? Juxtaposing archival and oral sources from the post‑war Volga region],” Gosudarstvo, Religiia, Tserkov´ v Rossii i za rubezhom 30, 3‑4 (2012): 485‑504.
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During the Brezhnev era, a irst peak of attention to anti‑religious work 
occurred in 1965, when there was a concerted effort to organize and promote 
new Soviet holidays and life‑cycle rituals that had been invented in the 1920s and 
1950s. This happened amidst rising concerns about dissenting groups that had 
split off from larger christian churches.26 A second peak occurred in 1972/73, 
when the focus was on reorganizing state propaganda efforts to make them more 
politically and economically effective.27 It would thus be inaccurate to say that 
the state gave up on atheist work under Brezhnev, although the rising complaints 
about the “religious indifference” of young people indicate that it became dificult 
to convince the population that religion continued to be harmful and dangerous 
under established socialism.28
One of these empirical studies with a broad geographical base presents no clear 
picture of steep increases in religiosity either, although its results did not please 
supporters of atheism. Surveys conducted by Moscow sociologists among ethnic 
Russians in four Soviet cities in 1970 and 1980 showed that declared religiosity 
rose slightly, but not dramatically across this decade. In Saratov, 12.2 percent of 
those surveyed in 1970 called themselves religious believers or wavering between 
belief and unbelief, and their number rose to 13.4 percent in 1980. Among ethnic 
Russians in Tashkent, percentages rose from 15 to 17.5  percent, in Kishinëv 
from 10.2 to 14.3 percent. Ethnic Russians in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, 
among whom self‑reported religiosity was highest in 1970, also experienced 
the sharpest rise, from 25 to 34.3 percent. during the same period, the reported 
observance of Christian holidays such as Christmas or Easter was higher than 
reported belief, and rose much more steeply: in Kishinëv they almost doubled from 
14.9 to 29.7 percent, while also rising from 27.2 to 34.2 percent in Saratov and 
from 22 to 28.5 percent in Tashkent.29 
The authors of the study suggest that ethnic consciousness was on the rise more 
than religiosity, especially in cities where Russians lived together with members 
of other nationalities. Another interpretation could be that by 1980, respondents 
perceived a lower risk in admitting to behavior that did not conform to Soviet 
ideological orthodoxy, a process of relaxation of ideological vigilance that is also 
26. John Anderson, religion, State and politics in the Soviet union and Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 69‑74; Victoria Smolkin‑Rothrock, “A Sacred Space is Never Empty: Soviet Atheism, 1954‑1971,” Ph.D. diss., University of California Berkeley, 2010; Elena Zhidkova, “Sovetskaia grazhdanskaia obriadnost´ kak al´ternativa obriadnosti religioznoi [Soviet civil rituals as alternatives to religious rituals],” Gosudarstvo, Religiia, Tserkov´ v Rossii i za rubezhom 30, 3‑4 (2012): 407‑428. 
27. During those years, for example, radio shows in the Mari ASSR focused on religion and alcohol abuse, Communist Party organizations focused on reactivating atheist propaganda, and local newspapers published series of pages of atheist materials entitled “Atheist’s page” 
(mariiskaia pravda, 1972) or “Page for believers and unbelievers” (Put´ k kommunizmu, Medvedevo district, February to September 1973).
28. Evgenii Khlebnikov, Nekotorye voprosy formirovaniia ateisticheskoi ubezhdennosti [Some questions of the formation of atheist convictions] (Ioshkar‑Ola: Mariiskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1977) 13‑14. 
29. arutiunian et al., russkie, 330.
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reported by Yelensky for the Ukrainian SSR.30 But many respondents framed their 
behavior as not motivated by religious belief, indicating that the shift may have 
been toward a more positive valuation of ethnic customs and traditions, while 
religion remained ideologically suspect. 
The combined evidence suggests that there was an increased interest in 
practices and traditions outside of Marxism‑Leninism among cultural and political 
elites in urban centers, including, but not limited to, involvement in religion 
and spirituality. along with this went a generational shift where young people 
who had come of age in the post‑war Soviet Union, whose external borders and 
political‑economic system were secure, were less receptive to calls for ideological 
vigilance.31 although this trend may indeed have helped prepare future leaders of 
a broader religious revival starting in the inal years of perestroika, the evidence 
should not be overinterpreted to the point where Brezhnev’s Soviet Union appears 
to be a society in hidden religious turmoil. The Orthodox journal editor was just 
one of many post‑Soviet religious activists whom i interviewed in the Volga region 
whose entry into religious practice had occurred late in life, after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The journal editor’s misgivings about norms of dress, gender, 
and liturgical participation in the church show her continued struggle to reconcile 
the different value systems she was exposed to over her lifetime. Only her 
mother’s death and Russian Orthodox burial about half a year before our interview 
had begun to soften her aversion, helping her to feel less self‑conscious about 
participation in church ritual. 
in a similar way, a Tatar factory worker who taught Quranic reading in the 
mosque and a Mari teacher who participated in traditional sacriicial rituals had 
taken up these practices after retirement age, when their mothers died and they 
became the oldest female member of their households, feeling responsibility for 
praying for dead ancestors and for the health and success of their children.32 
What these interviewees brought from their late Soviet youths was less an ongoing 
religious commitment than an approach to acquiring new skills and knowledge. 
They did not take up religious practice as something natural, but systematically 
tried to acquire knowledge about it through reading books and listening to radio 
shows. The Tatar woman even took a correspondence course at the medrese (islamic 
school) in Kazan, the capital of neighboring Tatarstan. Similar to the members of 
the last Soviet generation interviewed by Alexei Yurchak, these people had lived 
their youth and early adulthood in a political system whose stability they accepted 
as given and within whose parameters they learned to work. it was only after the 
unexpected disappearance of this political system that they discovered that many 
30. Yelensky, “Revival before the Revival,” 318.
31. juliane fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post‑War Youth and the Emergence of 
Late Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Diane Koenker, Anne Gorsuch, “Introduction: The Socialist 1960s in Global Perspective,” in Koenker, Gorsuch, eds, The Socialist Sixties, 1‑21. 
32. Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style, 208‑209. These women were born in 1942 and 1945, 
respectively. 
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of their skills could be put to new uses in the service of new ideological purposes. 
Given that some former Komsomol organizers and trade union secretaries became 
entrepreneurs while others became religious activists,33 each group beneiting from 
skills of “working with people” that they acquired in Soviet ideological work,34 it 
seems to make less sense to look for a direct link between post‑Soviet religiosity 
and Brezhnev‑era religious searches. Rather, one could ask what skills, habits, and 
expectations people brought from their Brezhnev‑era youths that could be recycled 
for ideologically unintended uses, and what internal contradictions existed within 
the ideals and lived experiences of that “surprisingly open” time that may have 
predisposed some people to look to religion for answers later, when the opportunity 
presented itself through a changed political climate and their own changing position 
in the succession of generations. 
Late socialism in memory and in the archives
other interviewees also framed their religious involvement as distinctly post‑Soviet, 
while tracing the skills and self‑expectations that made them effective participants 
in religious work to the late Soviet era. A biologist involved in training Orthodox 
christian women as Sisters of mercy said that it was easy to recruit doctors to 
give these laywomen basic paramedical training, because Soviet physicians had all 
participated in initiatives to educate the broader public about medicine and spread 
scientiic ways of looking at the world. As a biologist, she had been part of the 
same networks of popular education, organized through the Communist Party’s 
department of propaganda and agitation and through the Knowledge Society 
(Obshchestvo Znanie).35 
These networks of lectures and workplace‑based study circles had had their irst 
post‑war blossoming under Khrushchev and were initially curtailed after Brezhnev 
took over, as part of his efforts to impose greater bureaucratic control on spheres 
that had been left to a certain degree of self‑direction during the Thaw. Networks 
of political education were soon permitted to grow again, but with a more regulated 
33. Alexei Yurchak, “Entrepreneurial Governmentality in Postsocialist Russia: A Cultural Investigation of Business Practices,” in Victoria Bonnell and T.  Gold, eds., The new 
entrepreneurs of europe and asia (New York: Sharpe, 2002), 278‑324; Luehrmann, “Recycling 
cultural construction.”
34. Douglas Rogers, “Old Belief between ‘Society’ and ‘Culture’: Remaking Moral Communities and Inequalities on a Former State Farm,” in Mark Steinberg and Catherine 
Wanner, eds., religion, morality, and community in post‑Soviet Societies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 115‑147. 
35. The Knowledge Society was founded in 1947, with a mandate to spread knowledge about Soviet political as well as scientific developments. See David Powell, antireligious 
propaganda in the Soviet union: a Study of mass persuasion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1975) and Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style. On the Society’s predecessors in popularizing Soviet science, see James T. Andrews, Science for the Masses: The Bolshevik State, Public Science, and the Popular Imagination in Soviet Russia, 1917‑1934 (College Station: Texas 
a & m university press, 2003). 
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curriculum and more emphasis on monitoring educational outcomes.36 post‑Soviet 
doctors with experience in “taking knowledge to the people,” as the motto of the 
Knowledge Society was, would have acquired these skills in the late Soviet system 
of adult education. it was these skills, rather than any prior religious dispositions, 
that they put to work in the interest of the church. 
A retired childcare worker leading a Baptist Bible study (born 1949) remembered 
her work as the propagandist of her work collective as a source of skills for adapting 
content to different audiences and showing how it connected to their lives. She kept 
photographs showing how she had traveled around the Volga region and to moscow 
for seminars. “God, I didn’t know you yet, but you were leading me already,” 
was her commentary when looking at the pictures, but also, more remorsefully, 
“Lord, forgive me for all the foolishness (bezobrazie).” She had thought she would 
never travel again after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now had renewed 
opportunities to do so through Baptist organizations.
A Mari writer who served as a Lutheran deacon (born 1955) treated his past as 
a Komsomol oficial with equal ambivalence: it was a source of skill and useful 
connections, but also led people to question his sincerity when he visited villages 
on mission trips, since they remembered that “he used to talk about completely 
different things.” He himself insisted he had really always talked “about the same 
thing, about goodness.” 
all these people entered into religious practice at a time when their secular 
careers had come to an end through the collapse of the Soviet union and their 
approaching retirement age. This change in national and personal life also meant an 
end of movement: no more seminars organized by the party or trade union, no more 
travels to villages for lectures and employment. When recalling the Soviet period, 
they all had quite positive memories, calling themselves convinced communists 
who were active in the Komsomol or the Communist Party. They also shared a kind 
of folk periodization of the Soviet period that i encountered in many conversations 
with people in Russia: life was good and economically secure until “Gorbachev” or 
“perestroika” came along and destroyed everything. from the hindsight of the early 
2000s, the relative prosperity of the 1970s has come to deine the Soviet Union 
for many who lived through its collapse (rather than, for example, the Stalin era). 
What deines the Brezhnev era in these memories is not “stagnation,” but relative 
material well‑being, security, and opportunities to move around within the space of 
the Soviet union.37 
However, the same people also remembered the hardship of doing ideological 
work, the constant struggle against lack of interest among members of their 
audience. The Baptist study leader contrasted the ease of spreading the word of God 
36. David Wedgwood Benn, persuasion and Soviet politics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 138‑140. 
37. Alaina Lemon, “Sympathy for the Weary State?: Cold War Chronotopes and Moscow 
others,” comparative Studies in Society and history, 51, 4 (2009): 832‑864; Gorsuch and Koenker, The Socialist Sixties.
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to the dificulty of getting people to listen to a lecture on the works of Lenin, which 
was only possible by promising them a dance afterwards. A rural sports teacher 
who had served as party secretary in his village since the late 1970s remembered 
that no one liked going door‑to‑door with political agitation: “people are tired, they 
are coming in after milking their cows, and here you come talking to them about 
politics.” for post‑Soviet religious activists, contrasting the ease with which they 
spread stories about God to the dificulty of spreading Marxism‑Leninism was a 
way of emphasizing the independent agency of God’s word. It is also a relection 
on Brezhnev‑era ideological work, and the contradiction between the effort and 
imagination it required from those who conducted it and the boredom and distraction 
with which audiences received its familiar messages. The contradiction is that 
between a society whose central forms were based on the need to mobilize for the 
future, while the citizens and those who governed them appeared more interested 
in stability. In personal memory, this contradiction appears in afirmations of being 
excited and committed to ideological work while inding it very dificult to achieve 
broad participation. In the archives, the speciic characteristics of Brezhnev‑era 
ideas about change and progress become most apparent when comparing them to 
the Khrushchev‑era campaigns they were designed to replace. 
Consider, for instance, the contrast between a campaign for public order in 
1960 and ideas about orderly transformations that survived into the 1970s. In 1960, 
the plenum of the ioshkar‑ola city committee of the communist party discussed 
measures taken to fulill the March 1959 Central Committee resolution “On the 
participation of toilers in maintaining public order in the country.”38 The aim was 
broad popular participation in the campaign, and the indicators for success were 
equally broad: membership in the newly established people’s patrols (narodnye 
druzhiny) and comrade’s courts counted as a sign of popular engagement, but so 
did participation in sports, amateur arts, and other presumably orderly ways of 
spending ones free time. proposed measures to improve the prevailing shortcomings 
in public support for order included: 
regularly carry out lectures, conversations, talks, discussions, and thematic 
and literary evenings for industrial and service workers. involve more toilers 
in amateur arts and sports, organize hiking trips, tours, and other mass events. Improve the work with the population in clubs, red corners, libraries, agitational 
points. further develop the activities of universities of culture.39
The ideal orderly society here is one in which individuals are engaged in public life 
in a variety of ways that are all assumed to serve the same ideological aims, but 
38. On the context of this resolution, see Brian LaPierre, Hooligans in Khrushchev’s Russia: 
defining, policing and producing deviance during the Thaw (madison: university of 
Wisconsin press, 2012), chapter 4.
39. GARME (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv respubliki Marii El – State Archive of the Republic of Marii El), f. P‑8, city committee of the Communist Party, Ioshkar‑Ola, op. 7, d. 480, l. 9, Resolution of the fifth plenum of the Ioshkar‑Ola city committee, September 20, 1960. 
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are very different in form and content. a hike in the mountains can equally serve 
public order as listening to a lecture or attending evening and weekend courses 
at a “university of culture.” All these activities are treated as ends in themselves; 
participation in them is already proof of the result they are intended to achieve – 
an engaged, mobilized society. Rather than being measured by external results, 
active engagement and ideological growth was supposed to manifest itself through 
sheer numbers of offerings and participants.40 
In the Brezhnev era, study remained important, but it was no longer an end in 
itself. fitting in with a rising interest in what one might call “audience research” 
– documenting and evaluating the effects of cultural and political events on 
participants41 – there seems to have been greater pressure on those conducting 
political study to produce evidence of its wider effects. Those effects that were 
easiest to document and most likely to impress superiors were increases in labor 
productivity, although the causal connection between study and productive labor 
often remained vague. In 1974, for example, instructors involved in political and 
economic education in a rural district of the mari aSSr met for a conference where 
they discussed “the inluence of different forms of education on the strengthening 
of labor activity.” The engaged participation of the collective farm workers in their 
study circles through “independent work […] with political literature,” discussions 
and presentations is still stressed, but it is now called “the method of activation,” 
and rhetorically linked to raising levels of “labor and political activity.” The report 
ends by praising the economic successes of the State Farm “New Life”: 
These can be explained by reference to the correct preparation, organization, 
and carrying out of courses in the schools of communist work with the livestock keepers […]. Constant attention to the retention of economic knowledge, study and dissemination of progressive experience, raising the level of political knowledge and of culture – all of this has a positive effect on the results of the 
productive activities of the whole farm.42
Participation and mobilization is no longer a good thing in and of itself, but 
is evaluated in terms of its economic results, as indicated in the shift toward 
“political and economic study” as an umbrella term for efforts of adult education. 
This can be read as a repudiation of Khrushchev’s hopes for a mobilized society 
where political study would translate directly into civic‑mindedness and a concern 
for the common good. It its with political analyses of the Brezhnev‑era Soviet 
40. This emphasis on “active participation” also manifested itself in evaluations of study circles. GARME, f. P‑8, op. 7, d. 506, Reports on the results of check‑ups on educational work, February 2 to March 24, 1960, l. 105‑105v. 
41. Benn, persuasion and Soviet politics, 138‑140; First, “From Spectator to Differentiated 
consumer.”
42. GARME, f. P‑14, Novyi Tor´´ial district committee of the Communist Party, op. 27, d. 10, l. 35‑36, Information on the state of political and economic study in Novyi Tor´´ial district in the 1973‑1974 academic year, May 31, 1974. 
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Union as one that emphasized bureaucratic control over trust in spontaneous 
mass activity,43 and also with Alexei Yurchak’s account of the “citational 
temporality,”44 in which familiar tropes such as independent work, new methods, 
and self‑activity remained operational even in a political system that would have 
been very uncomfortable with their literal implications. However, by constantly 
citing tropes of mobilization, newness, and personal development, Brezhnev‑era 
discourse also preserved internal contradictions that undermined the aim of 
stability. The discourse of “spiritual development” is especially important for 
understanding how Brezhnev era social dynamics could help prepare the way 
for post‑Soviet religious revival while remaining oriented to the secular spheres of 
human labor and interpersonal relations. 
The spirit of late socialism
Scholarship on perestroika has noted the frequency with which Mikhail Gorbachev 
referred to “spirituality” (dukhovnost´) and called for renewed attention to 
spiritual aspects of communist construction.45 a connection that is less commonly 
made is that to the term “spiritual values” (dukhovnye tsennosti) that was an 
important concern in Khrushchev and Brezhnev‑era campaigns against drinking, 
petty theft, and vandalism and for cultured life.46 in these older Soviet usages, 
“spiritual” is not analogous to “religious” or “supernatural.” rather, it refers 
to the sphere of ideas, human personality, and interpersonal relations, as opposed 
to the “material” sphere of physical labor and relations of production that Orthodox 
Marxism described. Through its roots in Hegelian philosophy, talk about spirit 
was associated with the ideas of growth and change that were characteristic of late 
Soviet systems of education. 
Khrushchev‑era appeals to spiritual values and spiritual development came with a 
theoretical claim about the importance of personal experience and meaning‑making 
for the transition from socialism to communism. A major collaborative study 
conducted by the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the 
Knowledge Society in the early 1960s (and published after Khrushchev’s removal 
from ofice) included empirical materials from twenty‑ive Soviet factories 
to illuminate the “spiritual world” of workers in the transition from socialism to 
communism, a goal that the 1961 Communist Party program declared to be within 
43. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders. 
44. Yurchak, everything was forever, 61‑63. 
45. Riita Pittman, “Perestroika and Soviet Cultural Politics: The Case of the Major Literary 
journals,” Soviet Studies, 42, 1 (1990): 111‑132; Mark Sandle, “The Final Word: The Draft 
party programme of july/august 1991,” europe‑asia Studies, 48, 7 (1996): 1131‑1150. 
46. Natasha Kolchevska, “Angels in the Home and at Work: Russian Women in the Khrushchev 
Years,” Women’s Studies Quarterly, 33, 3‑4 (2005): 114‑137, esp. 123; Susan Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De‑Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,” Slavic review, 61, 2 (2002): 211‑252, esp. 225 n. 53. 
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reach of a single generation.47 At a conference devoted to the book project, managing 
editor Tsolak Aleksandrovich Stepanian explained that during the transition from 
socialism to communism, consciousness no longer merely relected being, but 
could advance ahead of it. for instance, progressive workers in socialist society 
could already have a “communist” consciousness, while productive relations were 
still at the socialist stage. Stepanian proclaimed that the most pressing social task 
was “the all‑round development of personality”48 – another term often associated 
with perestroika that has deeper Soviet roots.49
The fact that this study was published in 1966 show that the language of spiritual 
values retained currency under Brezhnev, even as hopes of the imminent onset of 
communism faded. While it certainly stands in contradiction with orthodox forms 
of Marxism, this language of spirituality should not be taken as a residual form of 
“invisible religion,”50 much less an expression of religious revival. In the works 
of Soviet sociologists, “spirituality” was an antidote to religion. By developing 
spiritual capacities, people diminished the hold of religious traditions on their 
lives. In the Mari ASSR, the sociologist Viktor Stepanovich Solov´ev wrote that 
the growth of “spiritual needs” (dukhovnye potrebnosti) of Soviet citizens was an 
opportunity to decrease their interest in religion, whereas state failures to provide 
cultural and spiritual sustenance held underserved populations back in harmful 
traditions. “It is not enough to liberate a person from the captivity of religious ideas, 
it is necessary to provide for his all‑round spiritual development,” as Solov´ev 
wrote in a study of atheism and religiosity in the mari aSSr.51 
In Solov´ev’s statistics, such “spiritual development” was measured mainly in 
terms of participation in a humanistic culture of reading books, attending cinema 
sessions, and striving to enlarge one’s circle of friends and acquaintances.52 
religious activity, argued these sociologists, was strong in those parts of the 
predominantly rural republic where clubs and other social services were either 
lacking or failed to offer programming for housewives and the elderly, two 
47. Tsolak Aleksandrovich Stepanian, ed., Stroitel´stvo kommunizma i dukhovnyi mir cheloveka [Communist construction and the spiritual world of the human being] (M.: Nauka, 1966).
48. GARF, f. R‑9547, All‑Union Knowledge Society, op. 1, d. 1314, l. 34, Stenograph of the 
scholarly conference “Laws of the formation and development of the spiritual life of communist society,” May 9‑11, 1963. 
49. J. Sutherland, “Perestroika in the Soviet General School: From Innovation to Independence?” in J. Dunstan, ed., Soviet education under perestroika (London: routledge, 1992), 14‑29. 
50. Thomas Luckmann, Die unsichtbare Religion [Invisible religion] (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1991).
51. Viktor Solov´ev, Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia – v praktiku ideologicheskoi raboty: Nekotorye itogi izucheniia problem byta, kul´tury, traditsii i verovanii naseleniia Mariiskoi 
aSSr [Sociological research in the service of ideological work: Some conclusions from the study of problems of everyday life, culture, traditions and beliefs of the population of the Mari ASSR], Ioshkar‑Ola: Mariiskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1977, p. 110. For more on Solov´ev’s 
work, see Luehrmann, Secularism Soviet Style, 54‑60. 
52. Solov´ev, Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 100; Luehrmann, “A Multireligious Region 
in an atheist State: unionwide policies meet communal distinctions in the postwar mari Republic,” in Wanner, ed., State Secularism and Lived religion, 272‑301, esp. 291‑295.
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categories of people who were not well integrated into Soviet collectives and thus 
considered to be at particular risk of turning to churches, mosques, and sacred 
groves. A study conducted among Russian Orthodox Mari villagers in 1967/68 
quoted a 73‑year‑old collective farm worker:
Why we go to church? I’ll tell you why. Where else should we old women go? Go to the club – the young people laugh at us there: “Where are you going, granny? Decided to dance?” And for our brother[s], the old men, nothing goes on at the club either. Either they reel off a ilm, or organize a dance. We don’t always have money to go see a ilm. And to church you can go without money.53
While trying to claim the label “spiritual” for secular Soviet culture alone, 
Brezhnev‑era scholars and cultural workers also perceived a competition 
between Soviet and religious institutions in providing for beauty, ediication, and 
companionship, as shown by the renewed emphasis on secular rituals starting in 
1965 and by debates in atheist journals such as nauka i religiia.54 But beating 
churches at their own game was suficient. In the context of a greater emphasis 
on measureable outcomes, cultural institutions had to stress the economic beneits 
of spiritual development. just as the effectiveness of political education was 
measured by increases in labor productivity, the ideal outcome of spiritual and 
moral development became a person who had excellent work ethics while also 
appreciating classical music and literature. In the logic of oficial reports, spiritual 
values, cultured leisure, and a diligent attitude to work amounted to the same thing. 
For example, a 1973 report on political study in the rural Mari ASSR quoted from a 
discussion in a workplace study circle where retail staff had discussed ways to raise 
their labor productivity. A participant noted that “customers in our country spend 
about thirty billion hours shopping.” Based on such facts, “participants became 
keenly aware of the importance of raising labor productivity in retail, [noting] 
that shortening the time spent on purchasing goods is of great signiicance for the 
spiritual growth (dukhovnogo rosta) of our workers.”55 
Religious activity stood in contrast to spiritual growth because it destroyed labor 
productivity. A newspaper article about a drunk driving accident on St. Elijah’s 
day (august 2), a day of commemoration of dead ancestors in many villages of the 
Mari ASSR, irst proclaims that “religion and drunkenness are inextricably linked,” 
and then itself goes on to construct a chain of consequences leading from the 
53. nikolai Sergeevich Sofronov, Ateisticheskoe vospitanie kolkhoznogo krest´ianstva [Atheist education for collective farm workers] (Ioshkar‑Ola: Mariiskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1973), 27. 
54. Smolkin‑Rothrock, “A Sacred Place is Never Empty”; “Problema ‘obyknovennoi’ sovetskoi smerti: Material´noe i dukhovnoe v ateisticheskoi kosmologii [The problem of ‘ordinary’ Soviet death: The material and the spiritual in atheist cosmology],” Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov´ v Rossii i za rubezhom, 30, 3‑4 (2012): 429‑462. 
55. GARME, f. P‑14, op. 26, d. 11, l. 64‑71, Information on the results of the academic year in the network of Party political education in Novyi Tor´´ial District, June 1, 1973. 
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physical to the economic and emotional: “Where there are religious holidays, there 
is drunkenness, hooliganism, deadly injuries, and as a result harm to the people’s 
economy, suffering to the family, and moral degeneration of the personality.”56 
The choice to follow these paths of religious degradation becomes all the harder 
to understand because Soviet public life is all about providing alternative ways 
to development: “in our country everything is done for the fullest harmonic 
development of the human being. For this we have Sports Palaces, theaters, 
cinemas, hiking trips and other events.”57
again, the language of personal development is tightly linked to the economic 
wellbeing of the country, but opposed to religion, which is connected to stasis 
and degradation. The ideal Soviet person that emerges from this equation 
of spiritual and material growth is exempliied in an article about Anatolii 
Amel´chenko, a rural club director who manages to entertain his audience and 
realize his own “creative plans” by making ilms about local cultural traditions 
and exemplary workers, while impressing others with his diligence and 
reliability. The young cultural worker’s dreams of a camera come true when 
his agitbrigade wins irst prize in a district competition, and superiors trust him 
because of the results he delivers. “You, Amel´chenko, […] are persistent not 
just in words, but in deeds. It’s a pleasure to help you,” says the collective 
farm chairman. In his lectures Amel´chenko always stresses the need to fulill 
the economic obligations of the collective farm: “The more material goods we 
create, the better conditions will be for the further blossoming of culture, for 
people’s spiritual growth.”58 
flights of the spirit
The igure of the exemplary lecturer and cultural worker Anatolii Amel´chenko 
illustrates the realities and limits of the remembered “openness” of the Brezhnev 
era. The article stresses creative work, which consists in documenting the economic 
successes of a collective farm, but also the openness of Soviet society to interethnic 
contacts and to its revolutionary and prerevolutionary heritage. Amel´chenko plans 
to make a ilm about a local Mari woman who married a Chuvash and moved 
to the neighboring republic of Chuvashia. His existing works document Mari 
dances and an excursion to the city of Ul´ianovsk, birthplace of Vladimir Lenin 
56. N. Goriachev, “Rasplata za p´ianku v Il´in den´ [Paying for drunkenness on St. Elijah’s Day],” Put´ k kommunizmu, August 25, 1973, 3.
57. Ibid. The link between religious traditions, alcohol, and uncultured and unhealthy behavior on the one hand and secular culture, health and wellbeing, and economic productivity on the 
other is consistently present in documents that deal with the struggle against religious holidays. See also GARME, f. P‑14, op. 26, d. 7, l. 115, Minutes of the district committee meetings of the CPSU, Novyi Tor´´ial, August 24, 1973. 
58. S. Zakharov, “Chelovek, kotorogo zhdut [The eagerly awaited man],” mariiskaia pravda, October 27, 1972, 4. 
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and restored nineteenth‑century town on the Volga. Amel´chenko’s own spiritual 
growth starts when he returns to his native village after service in the army,59 and 
continues as he puts his creative talents and diligent determination in the service 
of his collective. This service is epitomized when he moderates a discussion about 
the farm’s contribution to the unionwide festivities for the iftieth anniversary of 
the USSR, celebrated in December 1972 and marked by special work obligations 
and premiums.
The article portrays the early 1970s as a time of optimism, in which different 
kinds of growth – in economic indicators, in creative possibilities, and in closeness 
between people – folded into one another quite easily. However, the equation 
between economic growth, intellectual development, and political usefulness could 
also become stiling, and here, I would propose, lie the internal contradictions 
that may have brought some of those who grew up in Brezhnev’s Soviet Union to 
religious searching. 
in european philosophical and religious traditions from St. paul to hegel, 
“spirit” is often a cipher for change, or more precisely, for the dynamic 
elements that propel collective and individual life forward.60 Brezhnev‑era polit‑
ical discourse continued to promote change and the value of newness, while 
political practice emphasized stability. The resulting contradictions encouraged 
behavior that appealed to the norms of Soviet discourse while carving out spaces 
outside the framework of oficial politics. Several scholars working on this period 
have pointed to groups of people who “opted out” of the oficial framework 
without “resisting” socialism. These include radio enthusiasts, stiliagi, amateur 
actors, hikers, and historical restorers, as well as people who told political jokes 
with a subtle brand of cynicism.61 many of these groups adopted some ideals of 
socialism – such as interest in technology or values of egalitarian access to culture 
– but used them for purposes of disengagement that subverted the monopoly of the 
Communist Party on citizens’ energy and imagination. Science iction literature 
has also been described as a genre that promoted socialist ideals of progress and 
change while enabling readers to dream of radical elsewheres.62 What is common 
to all these ields of hobby and recreation is that they present places somewhat 
outside the political structures in which people could live out ideals of equality 
and transformation that were proclaimed in political rhetoric, but denied by the 
59. on Brezhnev‑era attempts to keep rural youths in their native regions, see rogers, The old 
faith and the russian Land, 136‑137.
60. Dominic Boyer, Spirit and System: media, intellectuals, and the dialectic in modern 
German culture (chicago: university of chicago press, 2005). 
61. Cathleen Giustino, Catherine Plum, and Alexander Vari, eds., Socialist escapes: Breaking Away from Everyday Routine in Eastern Europe, 1945‑1989 (New York: Berghahn, 2013); 
peter Steiner, “introduction: on Samizdat, Tamizdat, magnitizdat and other Strange Words 
that are difficult to pronounce,” poetics Today, 29, 4 (2008): 613‑628; Alexei Yurchak, “The 
cynical reason of Late Socialism: power, pretense, and the anekdot,” Public Culture, 19, 2 (1997): 161‑188.
62. Rustam Kats, istoriia sovetskoi fantastiki [History of Soviet science fiction] (SPb.: Izdatel´stvo Sankt‑Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2004).
562 Sonja Luehrmann
practice of “respect for personnel” that gave Brezhnev‑era society its feeling of 
unchanging stability.63 
Some high‑proile religious igures of late Soviet and post‑Soviet Russia come 
out of this milieu of deliberate disengagement from oficial politics, including 
liberal Russian Orthodox igures such as Alexander Men´ and more conservative 
priests such as father dmitrii Smirnov.64 As noted above, the provincial post‑Soviet 
religious activists i interviewed tended to have a different, less oppositional 
trajectory. Coming out of cultural professions, their portrayals of themselves in 
the Soviet era resembled the club director Amel´chenko more than a disengaged 
dissident. What distinguished them from the stereotypical party cadre, however, was 
how seriously many of them claimed to have taken the calls for social engagement 
and spiritual growth to which they were routinely exposed. “I preferred to be a true 
communist outside the party rather than a careerist within it,” said the Tatar teacher 
of Quranic reading when she, gratefully in retrospect, recalled her refusal to join 
the Communist Party when invited to do so “because they needed more workers to 
join.” As a trade union activist in charge of organizing amateur performances, she 
took the discourse of constant spiritual growth more literally than it was probably 
meant, and refused to equate it with the growth of her own career. at the same time, 
she clearly identiied as having been not just a simple worker, but an “activist,” 
and continued to apply the term obshchestvennaia rabota (social/volunteer work) 
to her current work at the mosque, begun in 1995. The Lutheran deacon and others 
expressed positive evaluations of Soviet initiatives of political education such as 
those of the Knowledge Society, pointing out that they brought crucial sources of 
information and entertainment to villages which were left to their own devices in 
post‑Soviet austerity. 
In Yurchak’s terminology, these people portrayed themselves as having been 
among the “true believers” in communism whom normal people regarded with 
suspicion, much as many russian citizens today regard people with too overt 
religious inclinations. in their recollections from post‑Soviet hindsight, the spirit 
of late socialism tends to be understood positively in terms of mobility, dynamic 
connections between city and countryside, and possibilities of intellectual growth. 
Stasis enters into the picture in two ways: first with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, when networks of training and mobility broke down. Second, in the idea 
that only a religious understanding of spiritual change truly allowed that change 
to continue over the whole life course and beyond, invalidating Soviet approaches 
to lifelong learning as illusionary. 
63. Hough and Fainsod, how the Soviet union is Governed, 253. for a vivid portrayal of this period in a North Caucasus republic from the point of view of a younger political cadre beginning his career in the middle of an old cohort of colleagues, see Georgi Derluguian, Bourdieu’s Secret Admirer in the Caucasus: A World‑System Biography (chicago: university 
of chicago press, 2005).
64. Nikolai Mitrokhin, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov´: Sovremennoe sostoianie i aktual´nye problemy [The Russian Orthodox Church: Contemporary situation and current problems] 
(m.: neprikosnovennyi zapas, 2004), 212. 
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The Lutheran deacon described his youth as a time of easy upward movement 
through facilitating structures: a boarding school for gifted Mari youth and the 
Higher Party School in Moscow which he attended as the third and last member 
of his nationality. This movement came to a halt during late perestroika, when the 
position as a radio announcer to which he had been “sent” after his studies was 
cancelled, forcing him to wander between temporary jobs. In 1993, at age 38, he 
found himself in the hospital with heart problems, and encountered Christianity 
through another patient, who read the Bible and prayed. “I didn’t know how to 
pray,” he recalled, “I wasn’t used to asking for anything.”
conclusion: The Brezhnev era seen from downstream
The initial dificulty of religious activity was a common theme of many interviews, 
as converts looked upstream from their post‑Soviet to their Soviet life. The deacon’s 
case shows perhaps most clearly that the process was not about abandoning one faith 
and choosing another, but accepting different norms of behavior and seeking out new 
sources of strength while retaining basic commitments to social service and personal 
development. In the Soviet Union of his youth, the budding Mari intellectual did not 
have to ask for anything because his path was determined by others who “sent” him 
places in the name of larger society. after a few years of stasis and stunted growth in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, ideals of growth and change could again be realized 
in the context of religious institutions. But a precondition was acknowledging the 
limits of any secular schemes of advancement, locating agency outside of human 
individuals and collectives, and personally requesting help from that non‑human 
source. The deacon’s struggle to make the switch underlines the strangeness of 
religious activity to many members of the last Soviet generation. Their ability to 
adjust attests to the enduring habits of learning which were inculcated in them from 
an early age, anticipating some of the catch‑phrases of perestroika. By continuing to 
promote lifelong learning during a time of stability, Brezhnev‑era bureaucrats may 
have kept their society more open to new and competing inluences than they ever 
intended. 
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